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VOLUTARINESS OF GUILTY PLEAS
adopted the latter interpretation, but the fact remains that without cross-
examination of Williams himself, "the jury was left with only the un-
elucidated, apparently damning, and patently damaging accusation as told
by Shaw."4
The Court has labored to discover the reach of the confrontation clause
when measured against conflicting demands of the hearsay exceptions.
One solution to the dilemma, wholly consistent with the decision in
Barber, would be to read the confrontation clause as a canon of pros-
ecutorial conduct. So read, the confrontation clause would require
prosecutors to make good faith attempts to procure people to testify, and
to allow hearsay only when necessity, trustworthiness and fairness-
arguably absent in Dutton-are present. Interpreted in this fashion, the
confrontation clause would bind the prosecutor, notwithstanding that an
exception to the hearsay rule would permit admission of the questionable
statement.44 A confrontation clause construed as a standard of pros-
ecutorial conduct might reasonably have resulted in a contrary holding in
Dutton. In addition, such a construction would afford improved pros-
ecutorial behavior and more ascertainable standards.
ROBERT D. Rizzo
Criminal Procedure-Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas in Plea
Bargaining Context
One of the basic purposes of our system of justice is to separate the
guilty defendant from the innocent.' The formal trial process and the
guilty plea process are the only means used to accomplish this end. The
formal trial process is laced with procedural, evidentiary, and other safe-
guards to protect against conviction of the innocent and to ensure that the
accused are better able to defend against the power and the resources of
the state.2 However, the guilty plea process contains far fewer safeguards,
and the safeguards that do exist vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.3
'8 Id.
"Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968).
1 D. NEWMAN, COIvcTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOcENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL 10 (1966).
'See L. MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 11-150 (rev. ed. 1963) for
a general discussion of the safeguards available at all stages of the procedure.
'D. NEw MAN, supra note 1, at 10.
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In the recent case of North Carolina v. Alford,4 the United States Supreme
Court significantly expanded the instances in which a guilty plea may be
determined to be voluntary while upholding the constitutionality. of the
plea bargaining process.
On December 2, 1963, Alford was indicted for first-degree murder,
a capital offense in North Carolina.5 Eight days later, on the recommenda-
tion of his court-appointed counsel, he pleaded guilty to a charge of second-
degree murder, a: noncapital offense." Before accepting the plea, the trial
judge heard incriminating testimony from three witnesses. Alford him-
self testified that he had not committed the murder but that he had pleaded
guilty because "they said if I didn't they would gas me for it ..... - While
Alfo'rd was on the stand his attorney established by questioning that Alford
V d been informed of his rights and of the alternatives available to him.0
Af this point in the proceedings, Alford stated, "I'm not guilty but I plead
guilty."'1 Then the court asked Alford if, in light of his denial of guilt,
le still wished to plead guilty, and Alford replied in the affirmative.
Tiereupon the trial court sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment for
second-degree murder.'1 At the state post-conviction hearing in 1965,
Alford's attorney testified that Alford had told the attorney that he was
innocent,' 2 but the state court found that the guilty plea was "willingly,
knowingly, and understandingly made on the advice of competent coun-
sel."' 3 Alford's subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
denied in both the district court and the court of appeals on the basis that
the plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered. 4 On Alford's second
petition for a writ of habeas corpus' 6 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, relying on Untited States v. Tackson,'5 held that Alford's guilty
" 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1969).Id.
The general testimony of the witnesses was that on the day of the killing when
Alford took his gun from his house he stated that he intended to kill the victim
and when he returned home he stated that he had carried out his purpose. 400 U.S.
t 28.
M"., Id at n.2:
' Brief for Appellee at 4, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
10400 U.S. at 28 n.2.
11This was and remains the maximum penalty available for second-degree murder
in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1969).
"Brief for Appellee at 4.
18400 U.S. at 29.
"Id. at' 29-30.
390 U.S. 570 (1968). See discussion pp. 797-98 infra.
'0 Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340, 347 (4th Cir. 1968).
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plea was involuntary because its principal motivation was the fear of death.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Jackson had not established
a new test for the validity of guilty pleas, and that a guilty, plea accom-
panied by protestations of innocence constitutionally may be accepted if
an inquiry into the factual basis for the plea discloses strong evidence of
actual guilt.
In Jackson the Court held that the death penalty clause of, the Federal
Kidnaping Act' 7 constituted an impermissible burden on the assertion of
the constitutional rights to trial by jury and against self-incrimination.'"
Under the Act a person accused of kidnaping, and failing to release the
victim unharmed, could avoid the possibility of capital punishment only
by pleading guilty or by pleading not guilty and waiving his right to a
jury trial. This choice arose as a result of a section of the Act that allowed
only the jury to impose the death penalty. 9 The Court reasoned that
since the death penalty could apply only to those defendants who contest
their guilt before a jury, the statute had a chilling effect on the exercise
of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial."0 The Court further found
that the statutory scheme encouraged guilty pleas and in doing so in-
fringed upon the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The
court of appeals evaluated the North Carolina statute and found that it
does not permit an accused who pleads not guilty to waive a jury trial.
The accused may avoid a jury trial only if he pleads guilty and, by
statute, a plea of guilty may not result in a punishment more severe than
life imprisonment. Thus a person accused of a capital crime in North
Carolina is faced with the awesome dilemma of risking the death
penalty in order to assert his rights to a jury trial and not to plead
guilty, or, alternatively, of pleading guilty to. avoid the possibility of
capital punishment.21
The court of appeals concluded that though the Jackson doctrine did not
require the automatic invalidation of guilty pleas, entered under the North
Carolina statutes, a prisoner is entitled to relief if he can demonstrat that
his plea was in fact a product of impermissible burdens of the statutory
scheme.2 2 However, the Court's own interpretation of Jackson does not
1718 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
18390 U.S. at 572.
19 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (1964).
20 "[T]he evil in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas
and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them." 390 U.S. at 583.
-1 405 F.2d at 344.
-2Id. at 347.
1971]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
go that far. In Brady v. United Statesm the Court determined that
Jackson does not require the invalidation of every guilty plea induced by
a fear of the death penalty. By inference it appears that some guilty pleas
induced by fear of the death penalty may be invalidated as coerced. The
Jackson rationale would seem to support the court of appeals' holding
that Alford's plea was the exceptional, coerced type. Since the Court in
Jackson held the statute unconstitutional because it may tend to coerce
guilty pleas, it is reasonable to conclude that the Jackson doctrine must
apply where the plea was in fact coerced by the presence of the statute.
However, in Alford the Supreme Court limited Jackson to its exact
facts and stated that the standard applied by the Fourth Circuit would
result in the invalidation of all guilty pleas entered on the fear of a death
sentence without regard to the statutory scheme involved.25
Having determined that the court of appeals had misconstrued the
scope of Jackson, the Court found it necessary to inquire into the effect
of Alford's contemporaneous protestations of innocence. After noting that
state and lower federal courts were divided on the isssue of whether a
guilty plea can be accepted when it is accompanied by protestations of
innocence and hence contains a waiver of trial but no admission of
guilt, 6 the Court gleaned "relevant principles" from two prior dissimilar
decisions. In the first case, Lynch v. Overholser,7 a trial judge refused
to accept a defendant's guilty plea because the judge had in his possession
a psychiatric report which indicated that the defendant possibly was not
guilty by reason of insanity. At the subsequent trial, though the de-
fendant did not rely on the defense of insanity, he was found not guilty for
that reason and committed to a mental institution. The Supreme Court
ordered his release and implied that the judge could have accepted the
plea even though he was aware of a defense. The second case relied on by
28397 U.S. 742 (1970).
"Id. at 747. Brady is distinguishable on the facts from Alford since Brady ex-
pressly admitted guilt.
S400 U.S. at 31.
8 The cases cited by the Court do not support this conclusion. In no case in
which a guilty plea was allowed did the defendant declare that he was not guilty as
in Alford. The true split of authority occurs when the accused is unwilling to
deny guilt or assert innocence because of total lack of recall as to the events sur-
rounding the act of which he is accused. Compare Hulsey v. United States, 369 F.2d
284, 287 (5th Cir. 1966), and State v. Levba, 80 N.M. 190, 453 P.2d 211 (1969),
with State v. Martinez, 89 Idaho 129, 403 P.2d 597 (1965), State ex rel. Crossley v.
Tahash, 263 Minn. 299, 116 N.W. 666 (1962), and Commonwealth v. Cottrell,
433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294 (1969).
27 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
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the Court, Hudson v. United States,2" established that federal courts have
the power to impose a prison sentence after accepting a -plea of nolo con-
tendere. In Alford, the Court reasoned that since a prison sentence
may be imposed under a plea of nolo contendere an express admission of
guilt is not constitutionally required even though a guilty plea normally
consists of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt.29
Thus, the two cases appear to establish that even though a defendant is
unwilling to admit guilt he may be sentenced to prison by a judge who is
aware of an available defense. However, Afford did more than acquiesce in
the entrance of a guilty plea; he affirmatively denied committing the crime
of which he was accused. Stating that there is no material difference be-
tween refusing to admit commission of a criminal act and affirmatively
denying it, the Court held that, in view of the overwhelming evidence
against Alford, he had made an intelligent choice between a trial for first-
degree murder and a plea of guilty to second-degree murder."0
It appears that both the trial court and the Supreme Court placed too
much reliance on the presentation of facts at the trial. In a situation such
as that in Alford where there is real doubt as to the voluntariness of the
plea, it is at best questionable to allow the balance to tip in favor of
acceptance of the plea on the basis of unchallenged testimony, when the
counsel for the defense neither cross-examined the witnesses nor presented
a rebuttal of their testimony. The primary purpose for the evidentiary
inquiry is to determine if there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty."1
It is suggested that the defendant's denial of guilt should negate any pro-
bative value of the testimony received. A contrary conclusion results in
a determination of guilt when there is a genuine dispute between the
state and the accused without the constitutional and procedural safeguards
inherent in a formal plenary trial.
It is submitted that the cases from which the Court derived its guide-
lines are distinguishable not only in fact but also in principle. Lynch is
" 272 U.S. 451 (1926).
" 400 U.S. at 37. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
" 400 U.S. at 37. See note 7 supra.
"t FE. R. Cnint. P. 11. The term "factual basis" is ambiguous. It could possibly
be held to mean that the factual situation is clear in the mind of the accused. How-
ever, the broader and more generally accepted definition is that it is the relationship
between the acts and the law and the determination that the accused's conduct falls
within the charge. Compare McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969),
with Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Note,
Criminal Procedure-Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty Pleas, 48 N.C.L. REv.
352 (1970).
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'qualified by the fact that the defendant did not want to rely on the defense
of which the judge was aware, whereas Alford appeared to have been
willing to assert any defense available. Hudson means simply that if a
defendant is unwilling to admit guilt, but does not desire to contest the
assertions of the state, he may be treated as though he is guilty.8 2 Alford,
too, was unwilling to admit guilt, but his contemporaneous statements
indicate that he did, in fact, wish to contest the assertion of the state that
he was guilty. It is difficult to accept the Court's conclusion that there
is no difference between a plea which refuses to admit guilt and a plea that
expressly denies guilt. If there were in fact no difference, there would have
been no reason for the development of the plea of nolo contendere. 88
Assuming that there is sufficient precedent to justify acceptance of a
guilty plea accompanied by protestations of innocence, the question of
the voluntariness of the guilty plea in Alford remains. Under the North
Carolina statutory scheme as it existed at the time of the plea, Alford had
a choice of going before a jury under what his counsel called "aggravated
circumstances" and receiving what Alford considered a certain death
penalty"4 or pleading guilty and facing a maximum penalty of life im-
prisonment.35 The added influence of an apparent promise by the
'prosecutor that he would accept a plea to a lesser offense and the constant
urgings by counsel combined to create an irresistible decision by Alford
that if he did not plead guilty he would face certain death.8 6
82 It should be noted that the Court in Hudson did not consider whether a plea
of nolo contendere would be accepted if accompanied by protestations of innocence.
The same arguments that apply to not allowing a plea of guilty in those circum-
stances also apply to a plea of nolo contendere. Under the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure the judge need not determine if there is a factual basis for a plea
of nolo contendere. FED. R. Clm. P. 11. However, North Carolina does require
that the trial judge examine an accused and insure that he is aware of the con-
sequences of his plea. State v. Payne, 263 N.C. 77, 138 S.E.2d 765 (1964).
88 City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 1964)
(dictum). For a discussion of the development of the plea of nolo contendere see
Lenvin & Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 YALE L.J.
1255 (1942).
" The alleged killing took place after an argument over a white woman who was
accompanying Alford at the time. Since both Alford and the decedent were Negroes,
Alford's attorney advised him that a jury in the southern city where the incident
took place could include prejudiced persons. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 3,
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). See L. MAYERS, supra note 2, at
117.
88 Ch. 616, [1953] N.C. SEss. L. 461, which allowed a plea of guilty to capital
offenses, was repealed by ch. 117, [1969] N.C. Snss. L. 104.
8 Alford did have considerable knowledge of the sentencing process based on his
long criminal record, which included one conviction for murder, nine for armed
robbery, and various other convictions. 400 U.S. at 29 n.4.
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The Court did not specifically mention the apparent promise by the
prosecutor. However, it did, through its language to the effect that Alford
had a choice of alternatives, recognize that the agreement probably was
made. Apparently the Court assumed that the widespread practice of
plea-bargaining3  is constitutional and was concerned merely with the
extent of its application.3 It is unquestionably sound policy that allows
a person accused of a crime to plead guilty after rationally considering the
alternatives available to him."9 However, it is submitted that the Court
should have considered all of the elements affecting this rationality in
combination as an aggregate force instead of weighing each one sep-
arately. This mode of analysis would have provided a realistic appraisal
-of whether the accused's plea was in fact voluntary. The combination
of a questionable statute, constant urgings of counsel, and a tempting
offer of a lesser charge with the constant, unequivocal assertions of
innocence should convince a court that a plea was not voluntarily rendered.
It is submitted that the Alford decision is due at least in part to the
crowded-docket anxiety, the fear that the courts will be overwhelmed
unless the instances in which the plea of guilty is allowed are increased.
But the cure for the problem of the crowded docket is legislative 'and admin-
istrative reform, not an undermining of the very rights that the courts
are designed to protect. The logical result of Alford is that in the future
it will be virtually impossible for a defendant to show coercion. It will
be of no avail to show that he was forced by statute to face a death penalty
in order to receive a jury trial. It will do him no good to show that he
did 'not want to plead guilty and that he protested his innocence from
the outset. If an accused is told by his counsel that there is a possibility
of a death sentence, that the situation is aggravated, and that the pros-
ecutor is willing to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge and he is com-
pelled by this to plead guilty, he will have no recourse in the courts of
the United States.
TIMOTHY J. SIMMONS
See generally Comment, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecu-
tors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
" For a thorough discussion of the major objections to plea bargaining and the
alternatives available, see Comment, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining,
83 HARv. L. REv. 1387 (1970). A discussion of the broader ramifications of
bargain justice appears in Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Stutdy
of Bargain Justice, 46 J. Cim. L.C. & P. 780, 790 (1956).
" Note, Criminal Procedure-Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty Pleas,
48 N.C.L. REv. 352, 359 (1970).
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